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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FINANCE COMPANY OF 
SALT LAKE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant~ 
vs. 
TI-IOMAS G. PATRICK and l\10NA \, 
RAE PA~RICK, ' 
Defendants and Respondentr. J 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 
10179 
STATEMENT OF ~rHE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff, an industrial loan 
corporation, on a promissory note given by defendants 
to recover a deficiency balance owing after foreclosure 
of a chattel mortgage by advertisement and sale. De-
fendant, ,-fhomas G. Patrick, claimed the obligation 
was discharged in his bankruptcy, and plaintiff con-
tended it was not so discharged because the defendant 
3 
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f~Tni~hed ,pl~intiff., a false -~nd fraudulent . financial 
sta tetiJ.ent in ·writing as. an iriduc~merit for the extension 
of ~r~dit: and. the· making of the loan. 
. . 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
At the pre-trial the Court granted defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss.-as to the defendant, Thomas G. 
Patrick, and gave judgment as prayed as to defendant, 
Mona Rae Patrick.· 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment granting 
the Motion to Dismiss as to defendant, Thomas G. 
Patrick. 
. . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is an industrial loan company of the 
State of Utah. Defe:qdants had borrowed money from 
the plaintiff and given security therefor in the form 
of a ·chattel mortgage. The note on which this action 
is . ba,sed was given in connection with a renewal. of a 
previous note. and .th.e renewal of a previous mortgage., 
said mortgage covering an old motor vehicle and items 
of. household .. furniture and furnishings. The plaintiff 
had. f9reclosed the chattel mortgage by advertisement 
I 
and sale in .accordance with the statutes of the State 
of Utah, . after default by the defendants, and there 
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ren1ained owing after application of the proceeds from 
such foreclosure a deficiency balance of $1,003.00. At 
the time of the renewal of the said obligation and the 
signing of the note on which this action is brought and 
of the chattel mortgage which had secured the same, 
the defendants, as an inducement to the renewal of 
the loan and the furnishing of additional funds, ex-
ecuted and delivered to the plaintiff a statement in 
writing as to their financial condition, which said state-
ment was introduced at the pre-trial as Exhibit PT 2. 
At the pre-trial, it was admitted ,through statements 
of counsel, that the defendant, Mona Rae Patrick, had 
no defense and that plaintiff was entitled to judgment 
against her as prayed. (R 7). It was likewise admitted 
that judgment would be entered against Thomas G. 
Patrick as prayed were it not for the fact that he had 
taken bankruptcy and had been discharged from his 
dischargeable debts, said defendant contending that 
the debt sued upon was so discharged and plaintiff con-
tending that it was not discharged by reason of the 
furnishing of the false financial statement (Ex. PT 2) 
as an inducement to the loan and extension of credit. 
(R 7). 
It was further admitted that all charges made by 
plaintiff and all things done in connection with the 
loan were in accordance with the statutes and that the 
amount of the renewal note included therein a charge 
of $19.04, which was a proper charge under the pro-
visions of the statutes of the State of Utah, 7-8-3 ( 1) 
(c) , L" tah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. ( R 8) . 
5 
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Exhibit PT ~ introduced and received at the pre-trial 
shows .that the financial statement (Ex. PT 2) omitted 
substantial obligations owing by the defendants at the 
time of the execution of said Exhibit PT 2 and the 
execution of the note sued upon. 
· Motion to dismiss was the made on behalf of de-
fendant, Thomas G. Patrick, "due to the fact that the 
company h~s charged' for making· an investigation and 
they, should have found this by the charge ... and did 
not' rely on the statement of the· creditor." (R 8). 
-- ,. 
The Court then granted the said defendants' Mo-
.. . ' . . - ' 
tio~ to Dismiss "upon th~. ground and for the reason 
~ha.t ._~hen. the plaintiff company charged $19.04, as it 
4ad a_ -~igh_t to .do under the statutes, then it could not 
rely upo~ the statements made by the defendant, but 
was obligated to spend that $19.04 in making its own 
investigation; that if it did not intend to rely upon the 
/ ' . ; -
investigttti<?n it_. ~ade in determining whether or not 





THE COLLECTION BY THE PLAINTIFF 
OF A CHARGE PERMITTED BY THE STAT-
UTE -.~O:R "EXAMINING AND INVESTI-
GATING THE C_HARACTER AND CIRCUM-
STANCES OF THE BORROWER'' DID NOT 
6 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
L\.S A l\iATTER OF LAW RELIEVE THE 
BORROWER FROM THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF ISSUING AND FURNISHING FALSE 
AND FRi\.UDULENT INFORMATION ON 1-\_ 
FINANC.IAL STATEMENT. 
There is no contention but that the plaintiff ope-
rated in every manner consistent with and as authorized 
by the statutes of the State of Utah and that the charges 
made by it were in conformity therewith. The statute 
specifically involved is included under the general 
powers of industrial loan corporations and reads in part 
as follows: 
"7 -8-3. General powers - Every industrial 
loan corporation shall have power: 
. . . (c) To charge a fee of $2.00 or less on 
loans of $100.00 or less and not to exceed 27o 
or $20.00, 'vhichever is smaller, on loans in excess 
of $100.00 for expense incurred by it in exam-
ining and investigating the character and circum-
stances of the borrower.'' 
The section of the Bankruptcy Act which would 
prevent the discharge of the obligation sued upon is 
contained in Title II_, Section 35, U.S.C.A._, as amend-
ed, which reads: 
" (a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release 
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts . . . 
except such as ... ( 2) are liabilities for obtain-
ing money or property by false pretenses or 
false representations, or for obtaining money or 
property on credit or obtaining an extension or 
rene"\tval of credit in reliance upon a materially 
7 
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false statement in writing respecting his financial 
. condition :q1ade or published or caused to be made 
or published in any manner whatsoever with 
intent to deceive ... " 
It should be noted that the ruling of the Court was 
not based upon the fact, or upon any contention, that 
thete was not or could not be presented evidenc~ that 
the defendant was· guilty. of ''obtaining an ex'tension 
or rene~al of credit in reliance upon a materially fals'e 
statement· in w·riting ·respecting his financial condition" 
etc., so' a~ to prevent his discharge under the provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Ac·t above quoted. On the contrary, 
the Court took the view that, notwithstanding any false 
or fraudulent 'representations or· the submission of any 
false statement··· in writing; no matter how flagrant 
the misrepres·entations therein might be, or regardless 
of whether or not the plaintiff did in fact rely upon 
such:· statements, that plaiiltiff could not clailn such 
r~liance by virtue ,Qf. its having taken the $19.04 which 
the statute permitted it to take. Such surely cannot 
be ~he la'Y, as it would be an open invitation to fraud . 
. we do not' argue with the general proposition of 
law tha,t when one makes an independent investigation 
upon which he relies, that he is ordinarily chargeable 
with· knowledge .of the facts which his investigation 
should· aisclose.. The- matter does not, however, end 
there. The rule: applicable to this niatter is stated in 
~ . I ,. , -. ~ 
23 Am .. Jur. "Fraud and Deceit" Section 144, Page 
945, as follows: 
8 
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''The 1nere fact that one makes an independent 
investigation or examination, or consults with 
others, does not necessarily show that he relies 
on his own judgment or on the information so 
gained, rather than on the representations of 
the other party, nor does it give rise to a pre-
sumption of law to that effecto If, under the cir-
cumstances, he is unable to learn the truth from 
such examination or investigation or, without 
fault on his part, does not learn it and in fact 
relies on the representations, he is entitled to 
relief, all other ingredients of liability being 
present." 
The rule is similarly stated in 37 Corpus Juris 
Secundum~ "Fraud," Section 37 (b), Page 286, as 
follows: 
" ... it is generally held that one in fact rely-
ing wholly on representations is not barred fron1 
relief merely because he made independent in-
quiry. Redress will not be denied nor lack of 
reliance conclusively presumed where the inves-
tigation failed to reveal the truth, nor will an 
unsuccessful investigation necessarily deprive the 
defrauded party of his right to rely on the 
speaker's representations. This is especially true 
where the investigation was rendered unsuccess-
ful by the deliberate artifice of the speaker, ... 
or because the facts were peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the speaker and difficult for the 
hear,er to ascertain.~~ (Emphasis supplied). 
The Court assumed that by the expeniture of 
$19.04, which was the maximum the plaintiff could 
charge under the statute for investigation fee, that 
plaintiff must be presumed to have learned everything 
9 
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there was to know .and everything which it required 
as to the· financial stability of the borrower and that it 
therefore relied exclusively upon such information and 
not upon any representations or information furnished 
by the borrower:. Such, of course, is a fallacy on its face. 
Let us examine- the practical situation in the light of 
the rules of law above herein referred to. 
As indicated, the Legis1ature limited the amount 
that could· .be charged for the examination fee to 2<fo 
of. the amount of the loan, which in this case was $19.04. 
In determini~g whether or not a loan should be made, 
and investiga~ing the character and circumstances of 
the borrower, there are a myraid of things whuch must 
be considered. Where the loan is to be secured by a 
chattel mortgage, as it was in this case, it requires some-
one fro~ the. _lending institution to go out to the home 
and check and list th.e items to be included on the mort-
gage. This entails an examination of the items and 
inquiries with regard to ownership thereof. It likewise 
inclu4es checking through -the Credit Bureau as well 
as the public records which will reflect any information 
with regard to the borrower. These methods and means 
of checking into the credit -and circun1stances of the 
borrower,. if followed through to their fullest, would, 
as will re.adily be seen_, require an expenditure of time, 
and therefore money, far in excess of the amount which 
the statute allows. But, this is not the problem involved 
here. The -rea]·probleni is that no matter how much time 
or :money might be expended by the lender in an inves-
10 
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tigation, all of the pertinent information as relates 
to the financial status of the borrower cannot be ob-
tained through any sources available to the lender. A 
considerable part of such information is necessarily 
within the sole and peculiar knowledge of the borrower. 
The lender must look to him and depend upon his repre-
sentations as to such matters. Let us elaborate on this 
phase of the matter. 
In connection with a proposed loan to an ordinary 
borrower, the lender checks all sources of public infor-
mation and checks information sources such as credit 
bureaus, the finance companies' local exchanges, banks 
and other references given by the borrower, so that 
it has run down every source normally available to it, and 
such might reflect that the borrower is in reasonably 
sound financial circumstances. Assuming, however, 
that this borrower then owes $1,000.00 to his father, 
$3,000.00 to a friend, and other monies to various indi-
viduals, which obligations are unsecured, how, except 
through inquiry of the borrower himself, can a lender 
know of such obligations which affect the financial 
stability of the borrower. How can the lender learn of 
obligations which might be owing in connection with 
purchases made by the borrower, short of circulating 
every wholesaler and retailer in the entire area, and even 
beyond? Even such, of course, would not disclose such 
obligations owing to individuals as relates to obliga-
tions for property purchased on Conditional Sales 
Contracts. Except as relates to motor vehicles, there is 
11 
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no public record of such obligations or any liens repre-
sented thereby. How, except through inquiry of the 
borrower can a lender learn of such obligations? 
If, as the- Court held, the lender cannot rely upon 
the" representaions in a written financial statement by 
the borrower, as to his obligations, "'Ne assume the lender 
likewise could not rely upon representations as to own-
ership of chattels which might be included on the mort-
gage·. As to such, how can the lender know whether 
or not such chattels are clear, or what if any obliga-
tions exist 'against the same, unless he can rely upon 
the representations of the borrower. 
It should thus become glaringly apparent that by 
making the charge permitted by statute for investi-
gating, the lender should not be presumed to have ascer-
tained or be chargeable with knowledge as to the charac-
ter and circumstances of the borrower, except at most 
as to those matters which reasonably and ordinarily 
could and would be ascertained through inquiry through 
regular and normal channels. Certainly, as the authori-
ties above cited indicate, the lender should not be charge-
able with knowledge as to facts peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the borrower. 
If any other conclusion is reached than that the 
borrower is, when he makes a financial state1nent, bound 
at his peril to truthfully set forth his circumstances, 
there is an open invitation to every borrower to defraud 
the lender. The law does not, we believe, encourage, 
nor sanction and protect such deceit. Surely, logic and 
12 
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common sense would indicate that the Legislature 
believed the lender of money under the Industrial Loan 
Act ought be reimbursed for expenses actually in-
curred by it up to the amount of 2ro of the loan in 
endeavoring to learn about the· borrower through the 
sources ordinarily open to it through normal inquiries. 
It surely did not contemplate that if such expendi-
tures were made in good faith that the lender then was 
precluded from relying upon representations made by 
the borrower as to his financial circumstances, and par-
ticularly as would relate to matters which could not, 
through any other reasonable means be ascertained. 
There is a rather extensive discussion of this matter 
of reliance where an independent investigation has been 
made in the case of Baylies vs. Vanden Boom_, (Wyo.) 
278 Pac. 551, 70 A.L.R. 924, preceding an annotation 
in that latter volume. The Court therein cites numerous 
cases with regard to the matter. The Court, quoting 
from another case, to-wit, Hetland vs. Bilstad_, (Iowa) 
118 N.W. 422, stated: 
"The fact that one does not procure the infor-
mation which ordinary prudence would dictate 
will not defeat recovery, where ,notwithstanding 
this, h~ relies on the sellers' misrepresentations." 
Again quoting with approval from the case of 
Smith vs. Werkheiser (Michigan) 115 N.W. 964, the 
Court stated: 
"It is urged that inasmuch as the books were 
placed at their disposal complainants were bound 
to ascertain the truth and to place no reliance 
13 
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upon the false statements that had been made 
to them. This is not the law. A defrauded party 
does not owe to the party who defrauds him an 
obligation to use diligence to discover the fraud." 
Later in the decision, that Court quotes with ap .. 
proval from Omar Oil & Gas Co. vs. Mackenzie Oil Co.) 
138 Atlantic 392, which involved a suit brought on 
notes and wherein the defense was that execution was 
induced by· fraud, contention being made that an inde-
pendent investigation was conducted and hence the 
representations were not relied upon. 'l,he quoted lan-
guage of the Court reads: 
"Relative to false representations, as a ground 
of defense, there is one fundamental rule, agreed 
upon by all the authorities, viz., that a buyer 
shall not be precluded from relying on such 
representations unless it clearly appears that 
he relied on his own investigation, and not on 
the representation. Mr. Pomeroy, at section 
895, note 4, states it thus: 
" 'The question is, did the party rely on the 
representation or on his own knowledge? To 
obviate the effect of the representation, it must 
be clearly and conclusively shown that he relied 
on his own knowledge. This, the general doctrine 
and .the qualifications both demand.' 
'' . . . The better and more reasonable doctrine, 
the one consistent with the fundamental rule, 
and supported by the majority of well-considered 
cases, including those in Texas, is this: The 
buyer will not be prevented from availing him-
self of false re:Rresentations of the seller. unless 
he makes an investigation on his own account 
14 
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and it is of such character as to fully acquaint 
him with the essential facts. If the buyer made 
an -investigation that was free and unhampered, 
and conditions were such that he must have ob-
tained the information he desired_, or the facts he 
seeks .to know were as obvious to him as to the 
seller_, and their means of knowledge were equal_, 
he is presumed to have relied on his own inves-
tigation, and not on the representation. In such 
case he could not have been misled by the seller.'' 
(Emphasis supplied). 
It will be observed that in this and in all other 
cases which we have been able to find, the only time 
when it is held as a 1natter of law that reliance was not 
placed upon false and fraudulent representations are 
in circumstances where the party so claiming to rely 
made a full and unhampered investigation and where 
the circumstances were such that he must have learned, 
or be in a position to learn, the facts from such investi-
gation. We have found no case nor authority which held 
that in spite of any independent investigation a person 
could not avail himself of false and fraudulent repre-
sentations made to him if he either ( 1 ) in fact relied 
upon them, or, (2) such representations related to 
matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the one 
making such representations, or would be difficult of 
ascertainment from other sources. 
There is nothing to show that plaintiff lender, had 
it tried through every conceivable means of investiga-
tion available, could have learned the facts as to the 
obligations owing and the financial circumstances of 
15 
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the defendant borrower in this case. There is nothing 
to show that it had access to any means of checking 
the items involved and that it failed to do so. Surely, 
there can be no presumption of law that by accepting 
a fee allowed by statute it had agreed to waive any 
legal rights under the Bankruptcy Act, or otherwise, 
to which it would be entitled resulting frorn false and 
fraudulent representations made to it by a borrower 
and as a result of which the plaintiff lender suffered 
damages. w-e cannot believe that a borrower, by pay-
ment of a maximum of $20.00, automatically purchases 
a statutory immunity from the effects of his willful 
fraudulent acts. 
The construction placed upon the statute by the 
Court would, as indicated, place a premium on fraud 
and completely relieve persons borrowing money under 
the Industrial Loan Act from the necessity of honest 
dealing and fair disclosure. Borrowing the words of 
the Court in Christensen vs. Jauron (Iowa) 174 N.W. 
499, "The law is not thus tender of persons practicing 
deceit." 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
erred in granting the motion of the defendant, Thomas 
G. Patrick, for summary judgment and that the Court's 
said Order should be reversed and the case remanded 
to the District Court for trial on the issues thereof as 
to said defendant. 
16 
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Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON & WATKISS 
600 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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